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TRIAL AND APPELLATE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
by
John M. Schmolesky*
URING the survey period, important developments occurred in the
field of trial and appellate criminal procedure. Among the more
significant developments were state and federal decisions affecting
the punishment stage of Texas criminal trials. The first part of this Article
discusses three main areas: recent decisions that define the scope of evidence
admissible at the punishment stage; recent decisions that address procedural
and substantive questions concerning the special punishment issue of use or
exhibition of a deadly weapon; and recent decisions that, while affirming the
facial validity of the Texas death penalty statute, raise substantial questions
about the constitutionality of the death penalty as the courts have applied it
in Texas.
During the survey period, Texas courts also commented on important
constitutional issues. Specifically, the courts further explicated several important state and federal constitutional decisions from past years. In the
aftermath of decisions declaring unconstitutional a statutorily authorized parole law jury instruction and a statute authorizing the admission of out-ofcourt videotaped statements of child sexual assault victims, the Texas courts
faced a welter of cases addressing such problems as the retroactivity of the
prior cases, whether error based upon the statutes could be harmless, and
whether a lack of a timely objection would result in a waiver of the claim.
The second part of this Article addresses the cases decided in the wake of
these prior decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. It also discusses the procedures devised by Texas courts in implementing a landmark
United States Supreme Court decision establishing new standards to prevent
racial discrimination in the selection of juries. Issues of procedural default,
retroactivity, and harmless error raised in these cases have prompted reconsideration of the availability of, and procedural requirements. for, habeas
corpus, which this Article addresses in the final section.
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law; J.D., University of Wisconsin School
of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin. The author would like to thank David Watts, St.
mary's 1990 and Erik Sunde, St. Mary's 1991, for their invaluable research assistance.
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RECENT DECISIONS CONCERNING PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH
SENTENCE

A. Evidence Admissible at the Punishment Stage of Trial
On June 21, 1989, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided four cases
concerning a confusing and uncertain area of law: the evidence admissible at
the punishment phase of the Texas system of bifurcated trials.' The confused state of the law is curious in light of the fact that the primary statute
regulating the evidence admissible at punishment 2 has been virtually unaltered for over twenty years. Although frequently litigated, the meaning of3
the key term "character" in the statute was an issue of first impression
before the highest court in criminal law matters. In addition, conflicting
authority existed concerning the admissibility of unadjudicated specific acts
of the defendant.
Although a number of cases had stated the general rule that courts cannot
admit either unadjudicated specific acts or the details of adjudicated offenses
at the punishment phase of a non-capital prosecution, 4 some courts had recognized an ill-defined exception when a defendant's specific acts were relevant to an application for probation or mitigation of punishment.5 In
Murphy v. State' the defendant took the stand and testified in response to
only three questions that were designed to establish Murphy's eligibility for a
grant of probation from the jury. Murphy testified that he was the person
1. Hedicke v. State, 779 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Drew v. State,
777 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988) (opinion on reh'g, en banc, June 21, 1989); King v. State, 773 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
2. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The statute
provides that either the prosecution or the defense may offer evidence "as to ... the prior
criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character." Id § 3(a).
3. Hedicke, 779 S.W.2d at 839. The Hedicke opinion recognized that litigants had raised
the question of the meaning of character evidence in earlier cases before the court of criminal
appeals, but that the court skirted direct examination of the issue. Id at 839 n.6.
4. See Ramey v. State, 575 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Sherman v. State,
537 S.W.2d 262, 264 frex. Crim. App. 1976); Lege v. State, 501 S.W.2d 880, 882 (rex. Crim.
App. 1973); Mullins v. State, 492 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Texas has traditionally recognized two exceptions to the general rule. First, courts allow the introduction of a
felony conviction (or a conviction for a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude) to attack the
character for truth and veracity of an accused who has testified on his own behalf. See Ochoa
v. State, 481 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Second, specific conduct can form the
basis for questions testing the knowledge of a reputation witness on cross-examination. See
Rutledge v. State, 749 S.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The prohibition against
evidence concerning specific defendant misconduct at the punishment stage of trial does not
apply to capital cases where almost anything connected to the defendant and the crime committed is both relevant and admissible. In Motley v. State, 773 S.W.2d 283, 294 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) the court denied a capital defendant's claim that, because such evidence would
have been inadmissible in a non-capital trial, the court denied him equal protection of the laws.
Accord Hogue v. State, 711 S.W.2d 9, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922
(1986); Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1110 (1985); Morin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Williams v. State,
622 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
5. The apparent source of this exception is Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967).
6. 777 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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who had been found guilty by the jury; that he had not been convicted of a
felony offense before; and that he had never been placed on felony probation.
The State expressed its intention of calling five witnesses to testify to
unadjudicated offenses that Murphy allegedly committed. The trial court
overruled the defense's objection to the proposed testimony.7 The court
found the testimony relevant "as to whether... defendant is a proper person
to have on the street on probation, or should in fact, be in the penitentiary
... ," As a result, the court permitted the prosecution 'to introduce evidence of five prior unadjudicated offenses committed within six months of
the offense at trial. 9 The jury did not recommend probation, but instead,
assessed life imprisonment.10
The court of appeals reversed, reading the "relevant to probation" cases
narrowly as allowing proof of unadjudicated acts only when the defense had
created a false impression as to the defendant's suitability for probation so
that the evidence was necessary for a fair determination of defense testimony.11 Because Murphy's carefully limited testimony had not created a
false impression as to his suitability for probation, the trial court erred in
allowing the State's evidence of the five unadjudicated acts. 12 On appeal to
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the State cited numerous cases that
interpreted the relevant to probation exception more broadly, supporting the
State's argument that the mere filing of an application for probation made
13
unadjudicated offense testimony admissible.
The court of criminal appeals resolved the conflicting authority by disapproving the cases cited by the State and affirming the decision of the court of
appeals.14 Thus, regardless of whether an application for probation has been
filed, neither the defense nor the State may introduce evidence of specific
7. Id. at 56.
8. Id.
9. The State introduced evidence that Murphy stole a purse, drove while intoxicated by
sniffing paint, fled officers in a three-county chase, and committed an assault by near strangulation, followed within an hour by ah arrest for public intoxication from sniffing paint. The State,
initially presented no evidence at the punishment stage of Murphy's trial, choosing to rest after
urging reconsideration of the evidence adduced at the guilt/innocence phase of trial. Only
after the defendant's limited testimony did the State introduce the extraneous offenses under
the theory that they were relevant to the application for probation. Id
10. Id
11. Murphy v. State, 700 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), aff'd, 777 S.W.2d 44
(rex. Crim. App. 1988).
12. 777 S.W.2d at 67-68.
13. See Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (following defendant's testimony that he had never been convicted of a felony, that the military had honorably
discharged him, and that he enjoyed a good work record and family life, the court permitted
the State to elicit, on cross-examination, that defendant had once purchased marijuana, even
though the State declined to prosecute him for the offense). See also Holmes v. State, 502
S.W.2d 728, 729 (rex. Crim. App. 1973) (in considering issue of probation, court allowed
prosecutor to elicit testimony from defendant concerning defendant's possible addiction to
controlled substances); McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (in
connection with motion for probation, court permitted prosecutor to elicit testimony from
defendant concerning defendant's prior hospitalization for drug addiction); Basaldua v. State,
481 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (during punishment proceedings admissible evidence not limited to that of prior criminal record, reputation, and character).
14. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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good or bad acts of a defendant. In addition, a trial court is required to
sustain an objection to such evidence. Murphy, however, creates a strategic
decision for the opponent of such improper evidence. By objecting, the opponent may prevent the introduction of the improper specific act evidence,
but, by foregoing an objection, the opponent is allowed to introduce otherwise impermissible specific act evidence in rebuttal. Thus, both sides can
impliedly consent to expand the evidence at the punishment phase to include
specific unadjudicated conduct of the defendant even though the Murphy
court found such evidence improper under the punishment evidence statute.Is The original proponent of specific act evidence assumes more than the
risk that an objection to the evidence will be sustained. Because the opponent may decide instead to accept the implicit invitation to expand the usual
rules of admissibility and engage in a good act/bad act contest, the original
proponent puts the choice in the hands of the opponent.
Drew v. State,1 6 decided the same day as Murphy, underscored the advisability of carefully considering becoming the original proponent of specific act
evidence. In Drew the State was the original proponent of specific, unadjudicated conduct evidence. At the punishment phase of Drew's trial for indecency with a child, the State presented the testimony of a nine-year old boy
whom the defendant had allegedly sexually assaulted. Because the extraneous offense was unadjudicated, the trial court erred by failing to sustain the
defense's objection. By being the original proponent of the evidence, the
State had, as the Murphy opinion put it, "in effect consented to admission of
specific acts of conduct .... "11 Drew also held that the defendant who
preserves error for review by objecting does not waive error by then present15. Id. at 67-68. The Court noted an exception to the inadmissibility of character evi-

dence rule for evidence relevant to specific fact issues created by the legislature. Examples
provided by Murphy include:
IT]he State must prove that the accused has been previously convicted in order to enhance range of punishment under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42.
Where the jury's verdict does not already constitute an affirmative finding of use
or exhibition of a deadly weapon... that fact must also be proven at the punishment phase for the State to reap the benefit of Article 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) or Article
42.18, § 8(b), V.A.C.C.P. To obtain a recommendation of probation from a
jury, an accused must plead and prove he has never before been convicted of a
felony offense. Article 42.12, § 3a(a), V.A.C.C.P. The issue whether one accused of aggravated kidnapping released his victim alive and in a safe place may
be submitted at the punishment phase, the burden apparently falling upon the
accused, since "proof of such release only mitigates punishment" under
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.04(b). Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987).
Id. at 62-63 n.10.
16. 777 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
17. Id. at 76 (citing Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). In Drew
the defense presented the opinion testimony of a psychologist that the defendant would be
susceptible to treatment in a particular program for sex offenders and that the defendant would
be capable of meeting the requirements of probation. Id. at 75. While the court held this
testimony admissible to rebut the State's unadjudicated offense evidence, which was improperly introduced over the defendant's objection, the Drew court observed that if the defendant
had offered the psychologist's testimony in the first instance, it would have opened the door to
the very evidence that caused the reversal of the conviction. Id at 76.
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ing specific act rebuttal evidence. 18
Dicta in Drew, and the holding in another case decided the same day,
King v. State,19 illustrate the perils of being first for the defense. Unlike
Murphy, who had carefully limited his testimony to establishing eligibility
for probation, King, in addition to testifying that he had no prior felony
convictions, testified that he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor that
was punishable by jail sentence, and that he would not violate any laws in

the future.20 The court sustained King's objection to the State's attempt to
elicit testimony that two days after the sale of cocaine for which King was
tried and convicted, King had been involved in the delivery of
methamphetamine. 2 1 The court, however, allowed the State to present this
same evidence after King's testimony.2 2 King's claims of past and future
good conduct sufficed to allow the State to introduce evidence of specific
misconduct. 23
Hedicke v. State,24 decided the same day as Murphy, also addressed the
admissibility of specific conduct testimony. The bulk of the opinion, however, concerned another punishment evidence issue: the admissibility of
opinion testimony. In Hedicke the defendant objected to the trial court's
refusal to allow defense witnesses to testify to specific instances of defendant's good conduct and to give their opinions of defendant's character. Consistent with Murphy, the court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial court's
action in forbidding the specific conduct testimony, but the court of criminal
appeals also held that the trial court erred in forbidding the opinion
testimony. 25
18. Id In a case like Drew, the defense may receive a double benefit: the ability to introduce specific act evidence that would not be admissible in the first instance (at least if the State
objects) and the ability to appeal the erroneous overruling of the defendant's objection. The
defendant's rebuttal may influence the jury to impose a lesser sentence, if the jury is more
influenced by it than by the unadjudicated bad act evidence originally tendered by the State.
But, if the jury imposes a sentence that the defendant dislikes, the error of the trial court will
result in appellate reversal (absent a harmless error finding). Because of the limitations upon
State appeal, the converse situation is not as advantageous. If the defendant originally offers
specific unadjudicated act evidence and the court erroneously denies the prosecution's objection, the State may introduce like kind rebuttal evidence. An appeal by the State, however, is
not possible. Not surprisingly, the Drew opinion cautioned that, "(b]ecause ordinarily it proceeds first with whatever punishment evidence it has, the State would be wise to save for
rebuttal any specific misconduct it may wish to present." Id
19. 773 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
20. Id at 303.
21. Id
22. Id.
23. Id. Even though the defendant's testimony did not refer to specific conduct, the court
allowed the State to proceed with evidence in rebuttal that the court had already held to violate the prohibition against specific unadjudicated misconduct evidence. Id
24. 779 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
25. Id at 842. In reaching this holding, the court was required to construe the meaning
of the term character evidence, as used in article 37.07 § 3(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, the punishment evidence statute. This statute allows for the introduction of the
defendant's prior record of adjudicated criminal offenses, reputation and character testimony.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Despite the presence
of the term character in the statute for over twenty years, the court of criminal appeals had
never previously defined the term. The most plausible explanation for this neglect stems from
the linguistic confusion that this term historically has engendered. The Hedicke court stated
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The Hedicke opinion acknowledged that, prior to the adoption of the 1965
Code of Criminal Procedure, the general rule provided that reputation testimony constituted the only permissible method of proving character and that
both opinion testimony and evidence of specific instances of conduct were
inadmissible. 26 While as Murphy demonstrated, the prohibition against specific conduct testimony remains, Hedicke held that the 1965 Code made
both opinion and reputation evidence admissible. 27 The court noted that the
prohibition against opinion testimony was adopted from civil law and derived from the policy concern that the prejudicial effect of opinion testimony
would outweigh the relevance value of opinion testimony with regard to the
determination of guilt or innocence. 28 The 1965 Code, however, created a
bifurcated trial system. By separating the question of guilt/innocence from
the question of the appropriate punishment, courts could admit evidence at
the second stage of trial that could not be allowed at the first. 29 Furthermore, because the drafters of the 1965 Code made both reputation and character evidence admissible at punishment, they must have had something
beyond reputation evidence in mind. Despite the unfortunate and redundant
use of the term character, the legislature obviously intended to make opinion
30
testimony admissible at punishment.
Although the quartet of cases of June 21, 1989, helped to clarify issues
that had been the source of confusion for years, the issues require further
legislative and/or judicial explication. For example, although Hedicke resolved doubt about the admissibility of opinion testimony, uncertainties still
remain as to what types of opinions are admissible. Is the witness limited to
an opinion of defendant's capacity for truth and veracity, or his peaceful and
law-abiding nature, or are other opinions allowed? In Drew the defense elicited the testimony of an expert as to the defendant's suitability for probation.
This testimony was held to be properly allowed by the trial court only because the court had improperly allowed the State to introduce evidence of an
unadjudicated offense over the defendant's objection. 3 1 But may a defendant
properly introduce such evidence in the first instance, or should the court
that the proper view of the term character includes both reputation and opinion evidence. 779
S.W.2d at 840. The term, however, has been used synonymously with one of these more spe-

cific methods of proof. To appreciate the depth of the confusion, the reader must realize that
courts have used the term character to mean reputation in contradistinction to opinion; but, at
other times, the exact opposite has been the case. Furthermore, during some periods of legal
history, courts have admitted both reputation and opinion testimony but, at other times, courts
have allowed only reputation evidence. See Hedicke, 779 S.W.2d at 840-41.
26. 779 S.W.2d at 842.
27. Id
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The decision to allow opinion testimony at punishment also mirrors the treatment
accorded to this issue under rules 404(c) and 405(a) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence,
which were not yet in effect at the time of Hedicke's trial. The new code, like Hedicke, treats
character evidence as a generic term that litigants may prove by various methods, including
reputation and opinion testimony. Rule 405(a) makes both reputation and opinion testimony
admissible "[i]n all cases in which evidence of character... is admissible .... " TEx. R. CRIM.
EvID. 405(a).
31. Drew, 777 S.W.2d at 75-76.
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32
sustain a State objection?
Although article 37.07 Section 3(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has been the exclusive legislative pronouncement concerning the evidence admissible at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial, its
provisions do not exhaustively determine what evidence is allowed. 33 Murphy held that interpretations of Allaben v. State,34 providing that merely applying for probation expanded the evidence admissible to include specific
conduct of the defendant, were erroneous. 3 5 Murphy, however, acknowledged that Allaben correctly held that "evidence of the circumstances of the
offender... such as his family background, religious affiliation, education,
employment history and the like, are appropriate considerations in assessment of punishment." 36 The permissible contours of this "circumstances of
the offender" evidence, and whether the evidence, is equally available to the
37
defense and prosecution remain unclear.
Just prior to the quartet of decisions from June 21, 1989, the legislature
passed a new statute during the 1989 session that comprehensively reorganized the structure of the post-conviction administration of criminal justice
in Texas.38 One small part of this large piece of legislation referred to the
evidence admissible at the punishment stage of a criminal trial. The new
statute simply declares that all evidence relevant to sentencing is admissible.39 The breadth of this language evinces a legislative intent to allow the
courts to grapple with this difficult issue. Although, arguably, this broad
language sweeps away all previous caselaw interpreting the former version of
article 37.07 Section 3(a), it is unlikely that the courts will ignore the few
guideposts the court of criminal appeals established in deciding what evidence should be admissible at punishment. Legislative and judicial recalcitrance in defining the proper limits of punishment evidence probably stems
from the amorphous nature of sentencing decisions. Unlike the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial where a charging instrument, alleging a
violation of a particular statute with defined elements, frames the issues to be

32. The State might argue, for example, that the question of the defendant's suitability for
probation invades the province of the jury or constitutes improper ultimate issue testimony.
Also, the State may assert that expert testimony is unnecessary because the determination is
within the jury's expertise.
33. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
34. 418 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
35. Murphy, 777 S.W.2d at 64.
36. Id
37. Can the State introduce evidence of the defendant's lack of employment or religious
affiliation? Can the State introduce opinion testimony to show that it considers the defendant a
poor risk for probation? Some case law suggests that the prosecution may not introduce such
evidence in the first instance, but, just as with evidence of the defendant's specific unadjudicated misconduct, may do so only in rebuttal. Although Murphy, Drew, and King clarified the
rebuttal-only approach for specific misconduct evidence, the scope and original admissibility of
circumstances of the offender evidence remains uncertain. For example, is evidence that the
defendant's employer fired him from his job on a particular date impermissible specific misconduct evidence or permissible circumstances of the offender evidence? Can the State introduce
this fact in the first instance or only in rebuttal?.
38. Act of June 15, 1989, ch. 786 § 404 (989 Vernon Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3471, 3492); see
Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

determined, nothing so defines the issues relevant to the question of the appropriate disposition of the convicted defendant. An indeterminate sentencing system, such as in Texas, has been held to require the widest possible
information about the offense and the offender in order to individualize an
appropriate disposition. 40 Such an approach is more easily accomplished
when the judge determines the sentence based upon a comprehensive
presentence investigation report developed by a probation officer. In Texas
cases where the defendant does not elect to have the jury sentence him, the
judge makes use of a presentence investigation report, which is not subject to
the rules of evidence, to provide a wide range of information about the convicted defendant. 41 In the federal system and in most states, for non-capital
cases the judge sentences the defendant based upon the information developed by a presentence report.42 But in Texas the defendant in any criminal
case can elect the jury to sentence.43 Yet, the legislature has never authorized the use of presentence investigation reports by the jury; rather, the information necessary to make an informed sentencing decision must be
developed in a formal hearing. 44 If Texas courts are to continue this unusual
method of determining sentences, either the legislature or the courts must
clarify the scope of the evidence that may be properly considered and other
issues relating to the punishment phase that have been consistently avoided
should be confronted.
B

Deadly Weapon Finding

One of the most important issues in Texas sentencing law is whether a
defendant's judgment of conviction contains a deadly weapon finding. If a
defendant's judgment of conviction contains a deadly weapon finding, the
trial judge cannot grant him regular adult probation and such an inmate
must serve a prison sentence at least until his parole eligibility date, without
having that date reduced by goodtime. 45 In contrast, inmates not burdened
with a deadly weapon finding have their minimum parole eligibility date advanced based upon the amount of good-time earned in custody.46 With the
large awards of good-time granted in Texas, this distinction can have a dramatic effect on the length of confinement. 47
40. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
41. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 4 (Vernon 1981).
42. Only six states currently allow active jury participation in the sentencing process in
non-capital felony convictions. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.055 (Michie Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon Supp. 1990); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926 (West 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-104 (1982); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1981). See also Kotler, Reappraisingthe Jury'sRole as
FinderofFact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123, 124 (1985) (commenting on the current expansion ofjury
power).
43. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
44. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 64 n. Il (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
45. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990); Id. art.
42.18, § 8(b)(1).
46. Id. § 8(a)-(b).
47. For example, a convicted defendant who receives a 60 year sentence, but whose judgment of conviction contains a deadly weapon finding, making him ineligible to have his parole
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The 1987 decision in Exparte Patterson48 saved a number of inmates from
the consequences of a deadly weapon finding. Pattersonheld that an accused
is entitled to notice that the use of a deadly weapon will be a contested issue
at the punishment phase of trial.4 9 The Patterson court made it clear that
the best way to provide notice is explicitly to allege the use of a deadly
weapon in the indictment or to allege the use of a weapon that is, per se,
deadly. 50 "Firearms", "rifles" and "handguns" are deadly weapons per se.5 1
The bare allegation of the use of one of these devices suffices to provide
notice that the use of a deadly weapon may be a fact issue at the punishment
stage of trial. By contrast, "knives" and "guns" are not, per se, deadly
52
weapons.
Although Patterson indicated that the preferred method of providing notice was to put an explicit or implicit allegation of deadly weapon use or
exhibition in the indictment, the court acknowledged the possibility that notice could be provided to the defense in some form other than the indictment
prior to the punishment stage of trial. 53 Patterson,however, held that unless
the State provided notice to the defendant in some form, the State could not
eligibility date advanced by the award of good-time, will serve 15 years in custody before
becoming eligible for parole. An inmate, however, whose parole eligibility date was accelerated by the good-time rate earned by every inmate upon arrival at the Division of Corrections
(20 days of good-time for each 30 days served) would become eligible for parole after nine
years. If the convicted defendant becomes a trusty, a status achieved by nine out of every ten
inmates, he can earn an extra ten days per month of goodtime, and he can achieve parole
eligibility in seven and a half years for the same maximum sentence of 60 years. If an inmate
earns the additional reductions of up to 15 days per month for completion of educational and
vocational programs, he can reduce the date of parole eligibility to under four years for a 60
year sentence. As of September 1, 1987, courts applied a new disadvantage to those inmates
whose judgments of convictions contained a deadly weapon finding. Inmates convicted prior
to this date do not receive a reduction in the minimum parole eligibility date. They were,
however, awarded good-time for the purpose of determining a mandatory release date, a date
at which parole-type release must be granted, which is determined by subtracting good-time
from the total sentence. Inmates convicted after the effective date of the legislative amendment
to article 42.18 of the code of criminal procedure, however, not only lose the benefit of subtracting good-time from the minimum parole eligibility date, but also no longer have a
mandatory release date. As a result, an inmate whose judgment contains a deadly weapon
finding will now serve his full sentence in prison unless the court grants discretionary parole.
Discretionary parole can only be granted after the minimum term before parole eligibility, onefourth of the total sentence or 15 years, whichever is less, is served in full without a reduction
for good-time. See Schmolesky, Time Changes. Growing Complexity in Texas Sentencing Law,
30 S. TEx. L. REv. 283, 286-90 (1989).
48. 740 S.W.2d 766 (rex. Crim. App. 1987).
49. Id. at 775.
50. I at 776.
51. See DeAnda v. State, 769 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Ex parte Kirkland, 768 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Ex parte Carrasco, 750 S.W.2d 222, 225
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
52. See Exparte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d at 767; Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985). An indictment alleging the use of a weapon that is not, however, per se
deadly may still provide notice to the defendant that the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon
will be an issue at the punishment stage of trial by an explicit allegation, such as: "The defendant caused serious bodily injury by stabbing the complainant with a knife, a deadly weapon."

See Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d at 776.
53. See Leberta v. State, 770 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1988, pet. ref'd)
(oral notice during plea bargaining sufficient notice); Kirkpatrick v. State, 747 S.W.2d 521, 523
(Tex.App.-Ft. Worth 1988, pet. ref'd) (oral notice sufficient).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

attempt to obtain a deadly weapon finding in the judgment.5 4
In two opinions issued on the same day, the court of criminal appeals
undermined the importance of Patterson without overruling it. In Ex parte
Beck -5 the defendant's murder indictment alleged that Beck murdered the
complainant by shooting him with a gun. 56 Following Beck's conviction, the
court submitted a special issue to the jury at the punishment stage concerning Beck's use or exhibition of a deadly weapon in the commission of the
offense. Based upon the jury's affirmative finding, the trial judge entered a
deadly weapon finding in the judgment. 57 A gun is not a deadly weapon, per
se, and the State provided no other written notice to the defendant prior to
the punishment stage. The court of criminal appeals ruled, however, that
the indictment sufficed to satisfy the notice requirement of Ex parte Patterson.58 The court reasoned that any allegation in an indictment that alleges
that death was caused by a named weapon or instrument necessarily includes an allegation that the named weapon or instrument was a deadly
weapon.59
6
The court of criminal appeals reached a similar result in Gilbert v. State, 0
a case involving injury but not death. Gilbert's indictment alleged that he
had intentionally caused serious bodily injury to a child fourteen years of age
or younger by putting the complainant into hot liquid. 6 1 Although hot liquid does not constitute a deadly weapon per se, and although the defendant
received no other notice that the deadly weapon issue would be raised at the
punishment phase, the court held that the indictment provided adequate notice to the defendant because it alleged that Gilbert had caused serious bodily injury. 62 This language necessarily included an allegation that the hot
liquid in this case was a deadly weapon because in the manner of its use the
water was capable of causing serious bodily injury, since it did cause serious
63
bodily injury.
The importance of Beck and Gilbert in reducing the impact of the notice
requirement of Ex parte Patterson was demonstrated by several cases during
the survey period that were originally reversed under Ex parte Patterson,but
were later affirmed upon reconsideration in light of Beck and Gilbert. Ex
parte Patterson, however, was not overruled, and, in limited circumstances,
54. 740 S.W.2d at 775.
55. 769 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
56. Id. at 526.

57. Id.

58. Id. at 526-27.
59. Id
60. 769 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
61. Id. at 536.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 536-37. The court of criminal appeals subsequently extended the holdings in
Beck and Gilbert to cases where the indictment merely alleged that the defendant attempted to
cause death by the use of a named weapon. See Ex parte Brown, 773 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989); Eason v. State, 768 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The court
justified this extension on the theory that the allegation of specific intent to commit murder
with the device necessarily included an allegation that the weapon named in the indictment
was deadly in the manner of its intended use. Id.
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it can still prevent the State from obtaining a deadly weapon finding if the
State has failed to provide some type of notice to the defendant and the
indictment neither explicitly nor implicitly alleges the use or exhibition of a
deadly weapon. For example, in Luken v. State64 the burglary indictment
alleged that Luken, "with intent to commit sexual assault, entered a habitation owned by... the [C]omplainant, without the effective consent of the
[C]omplainant ....-"65 The indictment failed to allege the use of any instrumentality, and furthermore, because the indictment made no allegation that
the defendant either caused death
or serious bodily injury, the holdings in
66
Beck and Gilbert did not apply.
The question of whether the defendant has received proper notice that the
deadly weapon question will be an issue at the punishment stage must be
distinguished from the actual finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly
weapon. In Polk v. State67 the court of criminal appeals established three
ways to make an affrmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly
weapon. 68 The court can automatically make such a finding upon a jury
verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment 69 if the indictment contained
an explicit allegation concerning a deadly weapon, or if the indictment
named the use of a weapon which is deadly per se.70 If the indictment satisfies neither of these prerequisites, the court can only make an affirmnative
finding if the court gives the jury a special issue concerning the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. 7 1 Thus, in Gilbert and Beck the allegations in the
indictments sufficed to give the defendant notice that the State might attempt to prove that the named device was a deadly weapon, but would not
suffice to lay the groundwork for an automatic jury finding of use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. Had the jury not answered a special issue that the
gun and the hot liquid involved in those cases constituted deadly weapons,
the court could not have made an affirmative finding even if the jury had
72
returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment.
Under the present state of the law, all indictments fall into one of three
categories. First, the indictment sufficiently provides notice and establishes
the basis for a per se finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. For
example, D caused bodily injury by stabbing the victim with a knife, a
deadly weapon, or, D caused the death of the victim by shooting him with a
rifle. Second, the indictment sufficiently provides notice, but not for an automatic finding upon a properly worded jury verdict. For example, D caused
bodily harm by stabbing the victim with a knife. In this situation, the court
can only make an affirmative finding if the court submits a special issue to
64. 780 S.W.2d 264 ('ex. Crim. App. 1989).
65. Id at 266.

66. Id.

67. 693 S.W.2d 391 (rex. Crim. App. 1985).
68. It at 393-94.
69. A reference to the indictment in the verdict is apparently required for there to be an
affirmative finding. See De Anda v. State, 769 S.W.2d 522, 523 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
70. Polk, 693 S.W.2d at 394.

71. Id.
72. See Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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the jury. Third, the indictment does not sufficiently provide notice and the
court cannot even submit the issue to the jury unless the State explicitly
provides the defense with notice by some adequate method other than
through the indictment. For example, D entered the home of the victim
without the victim's effective consent with intent to commit sexual assault.
A finding that has such a crucial impact on the question of the type and
length of sentence served should not have such a cumbersome and needlessly
complex administration. In addition to streamlining the procedural method
of making a deadly weapon finding, the legislature should reconsider the
purpose that such a finding serves. Several cases from the survey period
demonstrate that the deadly weapon concept has undergone such an expansion that in any case in which injury was caused or intended, a deadly
weapon finding could be made unless the defendant-was merely guilty as a
party to the offense. 73 For example, courts have held "hands," 74 "hot liquid" 75 and an "automobile" 76 to be deadly weapons by the manner of their
use. Furthermore, an appellate court sustained a deadly weapon finding
7
even though the object used to commit the crime was unknown. "
What may have begun as a defensible additional deterrent to the use of
dangerous weapons, like firearms, has become an amorphous tool for
prosecutorial leverage. If the prosecution seeks no deadly weapon finding
and avoids using explicit or implicit deadly weapon language in the indictment, a court will not make such a finding even if the defendant used or
exhibited a deadly weapon. In fact, even when an indictment explicitly alleges that the defendant used a deadly weapon, the State may bargain to
provide that a deadly weapon finding will not be part of the judgment. 78 Yet
in other cases, where, for example, a defendant injures with his own hands,
73. Courts must base a deadly weapon finding on the defendant's own use or exhibition of
a deadly weapon, and courts may not premise a deadly weapon finding on a party liability
theory. See Travelstead v. State, 693 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
74. Cooper v. State, 773 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.);
Johnson v. State, 770 S.W. 72 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1989, pet. granted)(feet and hands can
constitute deadly weapons).
75. Gilbert v. State, 769 S.W.2d 535, 536 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
76. Morgan v. State, 775 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
Morgan illustrates the broad scope of the concept of deadly weapon. The State indicted Morgan for felony theft of an automobile based upon an incident in which Morgan attempted to
drive away from a car dealership in a car that the dealership had allowed him to test drive.
The salesman jumped on the car in an attempt to prevent the theft. Despite the fact that the
salesman did not fall from the car and was not injured, the jury found that the car was a deadly
weapon. Id at 406. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a rational trier of fact could
have found that defendant used the car in a way that was capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury. Id. at 407.
77. Mixon v. State, No. A14-89-00202-CR, slip op. (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.]
Oct. 12, 1989). In Mixon the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the offense of murder, and
the trial court sentenced him. At trial, the medical examiner testified that he did not know
what object was used to strangle the victim. The Court of Appeals stated: "The fact that [the
instrument used to strangle the victim] was not specifically named did not make it any less a
deadly weapon, and the judge, as fact finder, was entitled to consider the evidence and make
such an affirmative finding." Id at 4-5.
78. See Exparte Hopson, 688 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Although the defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment that explicitly alleged that he threatened to use a deadly
weapon in order to escape from custody, the court reformed the judgment to omit the deadly
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little reason exists to provide an additional penalty beyond that which is
already provided for in a crime where the defendant causes injury.
C.

Texas Death Penalty

Two important United States Supreme Court cases7 9 last term construed
the Texas death penalty statute.s° While Franklin v. Lynaugh reaffirmed the
constitutionality of the statute and the United States Supreme Court's previous approval of it in Jurek v. Texas,$' Penry v. Lynaugh raised serious
doubts about whether the facially valid death penalty statute could be applied constitutionally.
Following the capital murder conviction of Donald Gene Franklin, the
defense presented its sole mitigating evidence at the punishment phase:
Franklin's clean disciplinary record while incarcerated from 1971-1974 and
again from 1976-1980.82 Franklin submitted five specially requested jury instructions. The instructions would have informed the jury that any mitigating evidence should be taken into account and could alone be enough to
return a negative answer to one or more of the issues, even if the jury otherwise believed that the special issues warranted yes answers.8 3 The trial court
refused to give the requested instruction. After the court of criminal appeals
affirmed Franklin's conviction, 8 4 Franklin ified a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, arguing that, absent his requested instructions, the special issues of
the Texas capital murder statute" limited the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence, contrary to several leading United States Supreme Court
opinions.8 6 Franklin argued that the jury may have harbored residual
doubts about his guilt and that the judge should have instructed the jury that
it could consider any such doubts in arriving at its answers to the special
weapon finding because one of the terms of the plea.agreement stated that the court would not
make a deadly weapon finding. Id. at 548.
79. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (plurality opinion).
80. TEx. CODE CUM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
81. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
82. Franklin, 108 S. Ct. at 2324, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 162.
83. Id
84. Franklin v. State, 693 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031

(1986).
85. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. Art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
86. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
In Lockett the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Ohio death penalty statute. 438 U.S.
at 597. The statute mandated a sentence of death if the court found one aggravating circumstance, and only upon a finding of one of three statutory mitigating circumstances would the
death sentence not be mandatory. The Court reasoned that under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and the circumstances of the
offense may not be precluded from consideration by the sentencer as mitigating factors. Id at
602-09. Thus, the Ohio statute, by limiting the factors to be considered to those statutorily
provided for, violated the Constitution. Id at 609. Eddings involved the Oklahoma death
penalty statute which allowed the sentencer to consider relevant mhitigating circumstances.
The sentencing judge concluded, however, that, as a matter of law, he could not consider the
evidence offered of the defendant's childhood abuse and emotional disturbance. The Supreme
Court, applying its reasoning in Lockett, concluded that if a state is precluded from statutorily
preventing a sentencer from consideration of mitigating evidence, the sentencer may not refuse
to consider, as a matter of law, mitigating evidence. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112-16.
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issues. On appeal from the affirmance of the denial of Franklin's federal
habeas corpus petition,87 a plurality opinion by Justice White8" rejected the
argument that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to an instruction
informing the jury to revisit guilt-innocence questions.8 9 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that the trial court placed no limitation on the opportunity
of Franklin's attorney to argue the residual doubt question to the sentencing
90
jury.
Franklin also argued that, absent his requested jury instruction, the jury
had no opportunity to give independent mitigating weight to his prison record. Again, the plurality opinion emphasized that the trial court had accorded Franklin a full opportunity to have the sentencing jury consider the
evidence that he presented concerning his prison record, and that the court
had allowed Franklin to argue the issue fully before the jury.91 Thus, the
court distinguished Franklin's case from Skipper v. South Carolina,9 2 where
evidence of the defendant's conduct while incarcerated was wholly excluded
from the jury's consideration. The second special issue submitted to the
jury, concerning the probability of the defendant's future dangerousness, was
an adequate vehicle by which the jury could weigh and evaluate Franklin's
93
disciplinary record.
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, disagreed with the majority's view of the prison conduct evidence. They found
that such evidence encompassed more than the matters considered by the
jury when the court asked it to answer the second special issue concerning a
probability of future criminal acts of violence. Justice Stevens stated:
Past conduct often provides insights into a person's character that will
evoke a merciful response to a demand for the ultimate punishment
even though it may shed no light on what may happen in the future.
Evidence of past good behavior in prison is relevant in this respect just
as is evidence of honorable military service or kindness94 to those in the
defendant's community or regular church attendance.
The concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun,
rejected the dissent's analysis of the relevance of a prison record. According
to Justice O'Connor, while "[e]vidence of voluntary service, kindness to
others, or of religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits
that might mitigate against the death penalty," a positive prison record
87. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (plurality opinion).
88. Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy joined Justice White. Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice Stevens led the
dissent joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall.
89. Franklin, 108 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2329.
92. 476 U.S. 1 (1985).
93. Franklin, 108 S. Ct. at 2329. The majority pointed out that the court's discussion in
Skipper of the relevancy of disciplinary record evidence in capital sentencing decisions dealt
exclusively with the question of how such evidence reflected on a defendant's likely future
behavior. Id
94. Id. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"reveals nothing about a defendant's character except that the defendant can
exist in a highly structured environment of a prison without endangering
others." 95 Despite the rejection of Franklin's argument, opponents of the
Texas death penalty system who have long been thwarted by the Supreme
Court's approval of the Texas death penalty scheme in Jurek, found a hopeful note in the concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor emphasized that since
the decision in Jurek, the court had made clear that the Constitution guarantees a defendant facing a possible death sentence not only the right to introduce mitigating evidence, but also the right to consideration of that evidence
by the sentencing authority. 96 Although the concurrence found that the jury
was free to give mitigating effect to the prison disciplinary evidence through
the second special issue, Justice O'Connor cautioned:
If, however, petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his
background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not
relevant to the special verdict questions or, that had relevance to the
defendant's moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict
questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no
97
vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that evidence.
Just four days after the decision in Franklin, the Supreme Court heard
such a case. 98 In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held
that while the Texas death penalty statute was facially constitutional, the
court had applied it in the trial of Johnny Paul Penry in a manner that
violated the Eighth Amendment. 99 Penry argued that mitigating evidence of
his mental retardation and childhood abuse had relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues and that the jury was unable
to express its reasoned moral response to that evidence in determining the
appropriateness of the death penalty.l10 Unlike the mitigating evidence of a
favorable prison disciplinary record, which could be fully considered by the
jury in answering the second special issue, Penry's mental retardation and
history of abuse was a two-edged sword: Penry's mental retardation and
history of abuse diminished his blameworthiness for the crime, but it also
indicated a probability of future dangerousness.10 1 The court's opinion in
Penry emphasized that the mitigating evidence concerning Penry's mental
retardation indicated that one effect of his retardation was his inability to
learn from his mistakes. 10 2 Although this evidence was relevant to the second issue, it was relevant only as an aggravatingfactor because it suggested a
yes answer to the question of future dangerousness. Although the court al95. IdMat 2333-34 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In fact, the concurrence pointed out that
Franklin argued to the sentencing jury that his prison record demonstrated his lack of future
dangerousness. His lack of disciplinary violations, however, revealed nothing more about any
other positive character trait.
96. Id. at 2333.
97. Id.
98. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989).
99. 109 S. Ct. at 2948, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 280.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2949, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 281.
102. Id
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lowed Penry to offer evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood, the court never instructed the jury that it could consider these
circumstances as mitigating evidence because the special issues did not, as
the Constitution requires, provide a vehicle for such consideration.10 3
Penry may result in the invalidation of the death sentences of many who
are already on death row in Texas. Because article 37.071 is still facially
constitutional, however, those whose cases are like Franklin's,in that they
did not present any mitigating evidence that could not be fully considered
through the special issues, will not be subject to reversal. Furthermore,
those defendants who failed to make a specific objection at trial on the
ground upon which Penry prevailed will likely be barred from presenting a
Penry claim on collateral attack. A majority in Penry stated that the holding
involved the application of settled precedent. As a result, Penry can be applied to others who were tried prior to Penry because no issue exists about
whether the Penry holding is the type of new rule that the courts should give
only prospective application.10 4 While this retroactivity aspect of Penry will
give hope to many now on death row, this same analysis may well doom the
chances of those who had raised a Penry claim on collateral attack, but who
did not make a contemporaneous objection at trial. Without a contemporaneous objection to preserve error, a claim cannot be presented in a federal
habeas corpus petition absent a showing of cause for failing to object and
prejudice as a result of failing to do so.105 One of the few ways in which a
defendant can show cause for failing to object is by demonstrating that a
claim is so novel that courts must excuse the failure to object.' 0 6 Penry most
likely will not provide relief for those on death row who did not make a
Penry-type objection at trial because the Penry court's declaration that the
decision is nothing more than application of well-established precedent
means that a claim of cause, based upon novelty, will not succeed.
Penry casts a longer shadow into the future than into the past. Defense
counsel in capital cases will no doubt attempt to build-in Penry-type error by
103. Id at 2952, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 284. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens

joined the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion that found the Texas special issues to be
unconstitutionally applied in Penry's case. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy
dissented to this part of the opinion, but these same four judges formed a majority with Justice
O'Connor in rejecting Penry's claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing capital
murderers who are retarded. The four justices who, with Justice O'Connor, formed the majority on the jury instruction issue (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) dissented to this
portion of the opinion for the Court.
104. The threshold issue that the Court considered in Penry was whether the Court should
consider Penry's claim on federal habeas corpus based upon whether or not a decision in
Penry's favor could be given retroactive application. In an important decision earlier in the
term, the United States Supreme Court held that unless a new decision can be given full retroactive application, courts cannot consider the merits of any new claim on federal habeas
corpus review. In addition to its significance to the Texas Capital Sentence Statute, Penmy is an
important decision because it represents the first application of Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989), by a majority of the Court and the first application of this new
requirement for federal habeas corpus review involving a capital sentence. A majority of the
Court in Penry held that Penry involved the application of settled precedents rather than the
creation of a new rule. Thus, the new rule was fully retroactive.
105. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977).
106. See, eg., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
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presenting evidence of a mitigating nature that could provide a reason for
the jury to extend mercy and vote for life, but which could also prompt a
juror to answer the special issues yes. 107 Trial courts may attempt to accommodate Penry by drafting an instruction that informs jurors that they may
consider all mitigating evidence in deciding the special issues. The implications of Penry, however, most likely cannot be so easily evaded. So long as
the court instructs the jury to concern itself with answering the special issues
yes or no, and a penalty of death or life follows depending solely on these
answers, a jury instruction dealing with mitigating evidence will be ineffective in curing the vice recognized in Penry. Only if the court drafts a jury

instruction that creates a fourth special issue allowing the jury to vote no to
death based upon the reduced blameworthiness of mitigating evidence that is

not already accommodated by the existing special issues can courts avoid
Penry error. The creation of such a jury instruction, however, amounts to an
amendment of the Texas capital sentencing statute. Such an action is beyond the proper authority of the courts and requires legislative action. Legislators who wish to continue providing a penalty of death in the state of
Texas will have to amend article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIOR CASE LAW AND
A.

STATUTES

Batson-Discrimination in Selection of Jury

Since the 1965 Supreme Court decision in Swain v. Alabama,10 8 courts
have recognized that a defendant may challenge the composition of a jury
that has been selected in a manner that discriminates against members of the
defendant's race. In order to establish a prima facie case under Swain, however, a defendant must prove a pattern of discrimination over a period of
time. Swain prohibited defendants from making an equal protection challenge based solely on the jury selection proceedings in his or her own case.10 9
The difficulty in implementing this equal protection right led to the Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 110 which, unlike Swain, allowed a
criminal defendant to challenge the composition of the petit jury on the
ground that the prosecution discriminated against jurors of the defendant's
race through the use of-racially motivated peremptory challenges in the defendant's own case."1 '
In order to establish a prima facie Batson claim, the movant must establish that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the
107. How easily the courts will find that factors are not susceptible to consideration under
the current special issues remains to be seen. Judge Clinton, for one, sees the potential for
evidence that is both mitigating and damning under the special issues for a number of factors.
See Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct.
3259, 106 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1989) (Clinton, J., dissenting).
108. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
109. See Id. at 223; Cuesta v. State, 763 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no
pet.).
110. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
111. Id at 96.
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prosecution exercised a pattern of peremptory strikes1 12 to remove venire
members of the defendant's race. 1 3 If the defendant establishes a prima
112. Some confusion has developed concerning the question of whether a single racially
motivated peremptory challenge establishes a Batson violation or whether multiple instances
are necessary to establish a pattern of discrimination. Munson v. State, 774 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, no pet.), held that only one strike based upon an improper motivation
was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a pattern. This holding conflicts with the court
of criminal appeal's decision in Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 737 (rex. Crim. App. 1987),
which stated:
If the State is unable to properly explain its use of peremptory strikes on
minority members of the prospective jury panel such that the trial court concludes that purposeful discrimination was the sole motivating factor behind any
(emphasis in original] of the State's strikes, then appellant's conviction must be
reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals.
But see Daniels v. State, 768 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, pet. ref'd) (two racially
motivated strikes sufficient to establish pattern of discrimination); Lewis v. State, 775 S.W.2d
13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. refrd) (three strikes clearly sufficient to create
presumption of pattern of discrimination).
113. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-99 (1986). Batson, based upon an equal protection theory, requires that the movant be of the same race as the stricken jurors. In addition,
evidence must be in the record by sworn testimony or stipulation to establish both the race of
the defendant and of the jurors struck by the prosecution. Under Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,
496-505 (1972), however, a defendant who is not the same race as jurors who have been peremptorily struck on the basis of race may make a due process challenge. Peters allowed a
white defendant to challenge the exclusion of black veniremembers on the due process theory
of deprivation of a jury that represents a cross-section of the community. Batson represents a
liberalization of the proof requirements for a showing of discrimination in the selection of the
jury by allowing evidence of the prosecutor's actions in the defendant's own case. Batson
provides no indication, however, that the same liberalization applies to claims arising under
Peters v. Kiff. Perhaps because courts view Batson as a pro-defense case, two defendants, in
cases decided during the survey period, raised claims that cited Batson even though the defendants in those cases were not members of the same race as the excluded jurors. See Mead v.
State, 759 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.) (white defendant challenged
exclusion of black jurors); Castillo v. State, 761 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, pet.
granted) (hispanic defendants challenged exclusion of blacks). Relying on Keeton v. State, 724
S.W.2d 58 (rex. Crim. App. 1987), the courts in Mead and Castilloheld that a Batson movant
had to be members of the same race as the challenged jurors. In Crawford v. State, 770
S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no pet.), a white defendant, citing Peters v. Kiff,
challenged, on due process grounds, the exclusion ofblack jurors. The trial court held that the
defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination based upon the actions of the
prosecutor in the case before the court and ruled that the same procedures should be followed
as in a Batson case. Id at 54. Unfortunately for the defendant, the trial court found the
prosecutor's justifications for the use of peremptory challenges credible. Id Crawford perhaps
implicitly holds that Batson also modified the standards and the procedures used for Peterstype claims as well. If that implicit holding is correct, Castillo and Mead suggest that it is not,
the same race requirement of Batson is unimportant because courts treat due process and equal
protection claims the same. As this article went to press, the United States Supreme Court
considered the appeal of a white defendant who claimed that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike two black venire members violated the fair cross-section requirement
of the 6th Amendment. See Holland v. Illinois, 58 U.S.L.W. 4162 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990) (Justice
Kennedy concurred and Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented). The
majority opinion noted that, in order to assert an equal protection claim under Batson, a defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecution
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race.
Id. at 4163. The Court held that such a correlation between the accused and the group identification of the excluded venire members was not required for the purpose of establishing standing to assert a fair cross-section under the 6th Amendment. Id.
The Court, however, held that Holland's 6th Amendment claim lacked merit because the
Court believed that a prohibition against the exclusion of cognizable groups through peremptory challenges has no basis in the text of the 6th Amendment or in the cases interpreting it.
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facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to rebut
the inference of discrimination. The State must show that the use of the
114
peremptory challenges rested on racially neutral grounds.
Cases decided during the survey period frequently litigated such Batson
issues as the remedy to be applied upon a finding of a Batson violation, the
criteria for evaluating neutral reasons offered by the prosecution, and the
procedural mechanisms for implementing Batson. Several cases held that in
order to preserve a Batson challenge, the defense must object at trial and
introduce evidence into the record to support an inference of the prosecutor's purposeful discrimination. 11 5 Even for cases tried before6 the Batson
decision, a failure to object at trial waived any Batson claim.1
To be timely, a defendant must make a Batson objection after the membership of the jury is known and prior to the swearing of the jury.1 17 The fact
Id at 4164. The majority opinion held that the Amendment's requirement that the venire

from which the parties choose the jury represent a fair cross section of the community constitutes "a means of assuring, not a representativejury (which the constitution does not demand),
but an impartialone (which it does)." I According to Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court,
peremptory challenges serve the 6th Amendment's goal of impartiality by permitting both the
defense and the State to eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups they think would
unduly favor the other side, thereby removing extremes of partiality on both sides. Id. at 4165.
The constitutional goal of an impartial jury would be obstructed by a petit jury fair crosssection requirement that would cripple the peremptory challenge system. Id Holland held
that the rule of Batson cannot be incorporated into the 6th Amendment. Id at 416-36.
Texas defendants who are not members of the same race as the excluded venire members
may have a broader right under Texas statutory law than is true of a Batson claim based on the
federal Constitution. In a recent case, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) held that
article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, unlike Batson, "does not require the
defendant to be of the same race as the challenged venire person." Atuesta v. State, No. 01-881194-CR (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Jan. 24, 1990, no pet.) (not yet reported). As a
result, in a trial of a Columbian national in Atuesta, the court properly required the prosecutor
to provide neutral explanations for the use of peremptory challenges against black venire members as well as an Hispanic member of the venire. See id at 4; see also Seubert v. State, 749
S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. granted) (a defendant may establish a
prima facia due process challenge when the prosecutor strikes jurors based on race in the
defendant's case, even when the defendant is not the same race as the prospective jurors). But
see Clarke v. State, No. 02-88-101-CR (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Feb. 14, 1990, no pet.) (not
yet reported) (defendants may not rely on a Batson challenge when the defendant is of a race
different from the stricken prospective jurors); Perry v. State, 770 S.W.2d 950 (rex. App.Fort Worth 1989, no pet.) (defendants are required to show systematic discrimination in a
number of cases, in order to establish a prima facia due process challenge to the striking of
venire members of a different race).
114. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
115. See Williams v. State, 773 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
257 (1989); Allen v. State, 769 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Mathews v. State, 768
S.W.2d 731 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
116. See McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
117. See Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. Crim. App: 1987); Green v. State, 771
S.W.2d 576, 576-77 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.); Cruz v. State, 762
S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.). Henry involved a Batson
objection made after the jury had been sworn. Henry's conviction, however, preceded the
Batson decision. Nevertheless, defense counsel had made an anticipatory objection to the State
striking black jurors prior to the exercise of peremptory strikes. Henry, 729 S.W.2d at 736-37.
Although under the circumstances Henry's objection was considered timely, the court cautioned, "We prospectively declare that a defendant may make a timely objection within the
Batson lines if such objection is made after the composition of the jury is known but before the
jury is sworn and the venire panel is discharged." Id. at 737 (emphasis in original). A recent
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that the trial court has held a Batson hearing does not cure the failure to
make a timely objection.11 8
If the defense makes a timely objection and establishes a prima facie Batson claim, the prosecutor can defeat the Batson challenge by providing racially neutral explanations for the exercise of peremptory strikes. Reasons
found acceptable in one case, however, may not be sustained as racially neutral in another. For example, in Daniels v. State1 19 the trial judge rejected
the prosecutor's explanation that the stricken jurors were inattentive and
gave more attention to the defense counsel.1 20 In Campbell v. State,1 2 1 however, the trial judge accepted the same justifications as racially neutral. 122
The two cases are not necessarily inconsistent. To test the credibility of the
prosecutor's explanation, the Danielsjudge applied a previously developed
five factor analysis: (1) the reason given does not relate to the facts of the
case; (2) there is an absence of any questions or meaningful questions on the
part of the prosecutor; (3) disparate treatment, as evidenced by a failure to
strike similarly situated members of the venire; (4) disparate examination of
the jurors, such as asking a question of one juror and not of others; (5) a
justification based on a group bias where the bias is not specifically shown to
apply to the individual venire member. 123 In Daniels the judge concluded
that, since the prosecutor never sought to engage the excluded jurors in discourse, the asserted explanations of lack of attentiveness and greater interest
in the defense lacked merit. 124
Prosecutors have asserted a prolific array of justifications for exercising
peremptory strikes. In Williams v. State' 25 the trial court accepted as valid
a host of justifications: youth, having no family, failing to disclose one's
entire criminal background, and a convicted relative. 126 Although judges
more closely scrutinize explanations based on subjective reasons than objective reasons, subjective reasons may still suffice. In Branch v. State 127 the
trial court accepted the subjective explanations of the prosecutor, but only
after applying a higher level of scrutiny to the subjective reasons than to the
court of appeals decision interpreted Henry as requiring an objection prior to the dismissal of
the remainder of the venire. Hawkins v. State, No. 05-88-01389-CR slip op. at 3 (Tex. App.-

Dallas Dec. 19, 1989). Hawkins, however, declared that a better reference point for measuring
the timeliness of a Batson objection is the swearing of the jury. IM slip op. at 4. The Hawkins
court did not feel bound by Henry, however, because it interpreted article 35.261 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted subsequent to the Henry decision, as mandating the
swearing of the jury as the point by which the Batson objection must be made. Id.
118. Green, 771 S.W.2d at 576.
119. 768 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, pet. refrd).
120. Id at 317.
121. 775 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
122. Id. at 422.
123. See Lewis v. State, 775 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet.
ref'd).
124. Daniels, 768 S.W.2d at 317.
125. 769 S.W.2d 682 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no pet).
126. Id. at 682-83.
127. 774 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1989, pet refrd).
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objective reasons. 12 In Campbell v. State 129 the court held that similarity in
age to the accused, national origin (Haiti when the case involved drugs),
doubting the credibility of the police, and radiating the impression of just
wanting to get the ordeal over with, all constituted racially neutral justifications.1 30 The acceptance of such reasons underscores the fact that the prosecutor is justifying a peremptory challenge and not a challenge for cause.
The defense has the right to cross-examine the prosecutor regarding his or
her motivation for exercising the peremptory strikes, and the denial of such
cross-examination is reversible error. 131 In order to sustain a Batson claim,
the defense must convince the trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence
132
that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated against the suspect race.
The appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the
trial court's ruling. The reviewing court must look at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the decision rendered. 133 Appellate courts use this
deferential standard based on the belief that the trial judge, who heard the
voir dire and the prosecutor's statement of reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges, is in the best position to determine credibility. Regardless of whether the trial court sustains or denies the Batson motion, the abuse
34
of discretion standard has led to few appellate reversals.'
Disagreement has developed as to what remedy courts should apply when
they sustain a Batson challenge. Article 35.261(b) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that a judge shall quash the array after sustaining a Batson challenge. 13 State ex reL Skeen v. Tunnell 13 6 concluded
that the language of article 35.261(b) is mandatory, and that a judge must
resort to calling a new array as the sole remedy when the judge sustains a
Batson challenge.' 3 7 Sims v. State, 3 8 however, held that the statute is not
mandatory and that more than one remedy exists for a successful Batson
challenge.139 According to Sims, as an alternative to quashing the array, the
trial court can also reinstate the jurors who are struck by the prosecutor. 4 0
128.
129.
130.
131.

I

at 784.
775 S.W.2d 419 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
Id. at 442.
See Newsome v. State, 771 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, pet ref'd);
Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 872, 874 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no pet.) (en banc).
132. See Cuesta v. State, 763 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no pet.).
133. Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), on remand, 749 S.W.2d
861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
134. See Barnett v. State, 771 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, nopet.); Daniels, 768 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, pet. ref'd); Catley v. State, 763 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
135. The statute states: "If the court determines that the attorney representing the state
challenged prospective jurors on the basis of race, the court shall call a new array in the case."
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261(b) (Vernon 1989).
136. 768 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no pet.).
137. Id. at 768; accord McKinney v. State, 761 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1988, no pet.).
138. 768 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, pet. granted).
139. It at 864.
140. Idt at 864-65.
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B. ParoleLaw Jury Instruction-Rose v. State
In Rose v. State 141 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declared unconstitutional a legislatively mandated instruction given to juries at the sentencing phase of criminal trials.' 42 The instruction provided information about
the possible release of prisoners prior to the expiration of a sentence due to
the laws concerning good time and parole. 143 The court based its decision
on the doctrine of separation of powers prescribed in Article II, section 1 of
the Texas Constitution and the doctrine of due course of law guaranteed by
Article I, sections 13 and 19 of the Texas Constitution. 14 Upon its own
motion for rehearing, the court determined that the giving of the erroneous
instruction was subject to a harmless error analysis under the standard provided by rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 145 Rose
has had a staggering impact on the appellate courts of the state. The court
141.

752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

142. Id at 534-37.
143. See TEx. CODE CIM. PROC. ANN.art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1990). The statute
provides:
In the penalty phase of the trial of the felony case in which the punishment is
to be assessed by the jury rather than the court, if the offense of which the jury
has found the defendant guilty is listed in § 3g(a)(1), Article 42.12, of this code
or if the judgment contains an affirmative finding under § 3g(a)(2), Article
42.12, of this code, unless the defendant has been convicted of a capital felony
the court shall charge the jury in writing as follows:

"Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of

imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration imposed through
the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct
time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison

work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct
time earned by the prisoner.
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be

imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.

"Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term
of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time
served equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less,
without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant
is sentenced to a term of less than six years, he must serve at least two years
before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that
parole will be granted.
"It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time
might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison
and parole authorities.
"You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time.
However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be
awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the
manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant."
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (Vernon 1990).
144. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 535-37.
145. Id at 553. The court of criminal appeals held that the error involved in Rose was
statutory error, not charging error. Id. This distinction provided the basis for the court's
rejection of the harm analysis mandated by Almanza v. State. Id (citing Almanza v. State,
686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987)). Almanza dealt
specifically with harm arising from error in jury instructions and placed the burden on the
appellant to show some harm. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Despite the court's rejection of
this analysis in Rose, some courts continue to rely on Almanza for its guidance on the issue of
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of criminal appeals has remanded hundreds of cases to the intermediate
146
courts for a harm analysis.
In its opinion on its own motion for rehearing, the court of criminal appeals in Rose (Rose II) considered three factors in concluding that the instruction the court gave in that case did not, beyond a reasonable doubt,
make any contribution to the punishment assessed: 1) the giving of an additional curative instruction beyond that contained in the statutory instruction, 2) the facts of the offense which militated in favor of a harsh sentence,
and 3) the appellant's criminal record. 147 Rose failed to indicate whether
these factors were inclusive or merely illustrative, given the particular case
before the court. Thus, the intermediate courts of appeals have struggled
with how to apply the harm analysis required by Rose.
The most divisive issue in the intermediate courts of appeals concerns the
question of whether Rose II limits the analysis of harm to the three factors
used in Rose J1.148 A close reading of Rose I may help clarify the apparent
confusion. In Rose I the majority indicated that the analysis was not limited
to specific factors, but would include consideration of the evidence admitted,
the charge on punishment, the argument of the parties, and other relevant
indicia of record. 149 Furthermore, the standard that rule 81(b)(2) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure has established requires a review of the
entire appellate record.15 0 Nevertheless, some courts of appeals adhere to a
rigid, predetermined list of factors to apply in the Rose analysis.' 5' The
which factors to consider for harm generally. See Hernandez v. State, 771 S.W.2d 596, 597
(rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.).
146. Brooks v. State, 768 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1989, nopet.)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (390 cases remanded by court of criminal appeals since Rose).
147. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554-55.
148. Compare Taylor v. State, 763 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989), aff'd sub
nom., Arnold v. State, No. TC-90-02-003 (rex. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 1990) (en banc) (court
limiting analysis to two factors in Rose: additional curative and harsh facts); Le v. State, 763
S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (court must consider three
factors of Rose); Bledsoe v. State, 763 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, pet. granted) (same); Evans v. State, 760 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988,
pet. ref'd) (limiting analysis to three factors of Rose) with Nunez v. State, 769 S.W.2d 599, 601
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no pet.) (court persuaded by additional factor of finding of use of
deadly weapon and requirement that one-third of sentence be served); Rodriguez v. State, 762
S.W.2d 727, 732 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1988, pet. granted) (notes sent from jury are factors); Allen v. State, 761 S.W.2d 384, 386 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. refl'd)
(argument or absence thereof of prosecutor regarding parole is a factor); Fair v. State, 758
S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (award of probation significant
factor).
149. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 536.
150. See Carson v. State, 765 S.W.2d 889, 890 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no pet.); Hartley
v. State, 765 S.W.2d 883, 884 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd); Rodriguez v. State, 762
S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, pet granted). The broad review analysis
these cases require appears to be the more reasoned and logical conclusion given the specific
language of 81(b)(2) which provides in relevant part, "If the appellate record in a criminal case
reveals error ....

."

TEx. R. App. P. 81(b)(2).

151. See Dickerson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989,
no pet.) (four factors to be applied, citing Taylor v. State, 755 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,pet. ref'd)and Fast v. State, 755 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). See also cases cited supra note 148.
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courts, however, have given this general division less attention than they
have given the issues raised by application of the three factors themselves.
The court of criminal appeals in Rose II found significant the trial court's
inclusion of an additional curative instruction beyond that provided by the
statute. 52 After noting this additional curative, the court stated that a rebuttable presumption exists that the jury followed the instructions given by
the trial judge.1 53 The court, however, did not make clear whether the presumption arises upon the issuance of the additional instruction or if the statutory curative instruction alone suffices.
Montgomery v. State 1 54 represents the most thorough argument concerning the two curative instructions. Montgomery compared the language of
the two curative instructions and concluded that any differences related to
form rather than to substance.' 55 Focusing on the statute's language proscribing consideration of the parole law as opposed to the additional instruction's proscription of discussion of the parole law, the majority in
Montgomery reasoned that the statutory admonition was in fact more restrictive than that found in Rose. 15 6 Montgomery held that the statutory
152. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554. The statutory curative admonishes jurors as follows:
"[Ylou are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or
forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole
law may be applied to this particular defendant." TEX. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07,
§ 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The additional curative instruction found significant in Rose further instructed the jury:
that in determining the punishment in this case, you are not to discuss among
yourselves how long the defendant will be required to serve any sentence you
decide to impose. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Governor of the State of Texas and are no
concern of yours.
Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554.
153. Id (citing Cobarrubio v. State, 675 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). An
analysis of Cobarrubioreveals that the instruction given to the jury in that case contained an
improper application of the law to the facts of the case. Id. at 751-52. Rose, on the other
hand, dealt with a statutorily mandated instruction that has been found unconstitutional. Arguably, because the entire instruction is unconstitutional, no part of it should be considered.
The intermediate courts of appeals have not adopted this view and are divided over the sufficiency of the statutory curative. See Payne v. State, 766 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989), rev'd sub nom, Arnold v. State, No. TC-90-02-003 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 24, 1990) (en
bane) (Enoch, C.J., concurring) (raising but rejecting the argument). Compare Diaz v. State,
769 S.W.2d 307, 308-0 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, nopet) (statutory curative sufficient
for presumption); Lett v. State, 768 S.W.2d 947, 948 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no pet.)
(statutory instruction no less curative than additional instruction of Rose); Montgomery v.
State, 760 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, pet. granted) (difference between additional curative of Rose and statutory curative is one of form, not substance) with Washington
v. State, 768 S.W.2d 497, 501 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (unreasonable to assume jury followed instruction of judge to disregard what judge
himself had told jury to do); Payne, 766 S.W.2d at 590 (McClung, J., dissenting) (additional
curative of Rose necessary); Kelly v. State, 762 S.W.2d 225, 226 (rex. App.-El Paso 1988, no
pet) (mere tracking of statutory language insufficient in absence of clear curative found in
Rose).
154. 760 S.W.2d 323 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, pet. granted).
155. Id at 327.
156. Id The basis for this holding is that consideration includes both verbal and mental
processes while discussion involves only a verbal process. Further, Montgomery read the last
sentence of the additional curative to imply to the jury the existence of parole laws, an implication which presumably would compound any difficulties the jury may already face in disre-
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instruction was no less curative than the additional instruction found in
Rose. 5 7 Thus, the presumption that the jury followed the court's instruction would have to be overcome even in the absence of an additional curative
instruction.
Another significant issue in the aftermath of Rose concerns the effect of
prosecutorial argument of parole to the jury. The court of criminal appeals
in Rose I made only brief reference in dicta to the impropriety of
prosecutorial invitation to jury consideration of the parole laws.' 5 8 On its
own motion for rehearing, the court in Rose II was not concerned with the
issue simply because the issue did not occur in the particular facts of Rose. 15 9
While the appellate courts agree that prosecutorial argument of parole is a
factor in the Rose analysis, the same cannot be said concerning the proper
application of this factor.160 Prosecutorial argument concerning parole laws
may not always result in a finding of harm. Courts have determined a
number of factors that effectively neutralize any harm from such
argumentation. 1 61
Whether the defense must object to a prosecutor's argument about parole
garding those laws. In addition, the majority pointed to the identical timing of the two
instructions and to the fact that they both constituted the judge's last word on the issue of
parole, a factor which led the Rose court to conclude the additional curative was significant.
Id. (citing Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554).
157. 760 S.W.2d at 327. Montgomey's analysis, however, is not the only position espoused
by the appellate courts on the issue. See Brooks v. State, 768 S.W.2d 481,483-91 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Brooks Justice O'Connor's
dissent found that despite the inclusion of the additional instruction by the trial judge, several
factors rendered the presumption rebutted. Id. at 485-91. In a lengthy and cogent discussion,
Justice O'Connor analyzed the legislative intent of article 37.07, the prominence of the references to parole in the charge, and the abstract nature of the instruction itself. Each of these
alone, the dissent argued, sufficed to rebut the presumption that the jury disregarded what they
had been told to disregard. Id at 490.
In another case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the absence of the additional
curative instruction, together with the burden placed on the State under rule 82(b)(2), results
in a presumption that the jury did consider the parole laws. See Olivarez v. State, 756 S.W.2d
113 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1988, no pet.); but see Shorten v. State, 764 S.W.2d 358, 359-60
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, pet. refrd) (criticizing Olivarezas narrow and disregarding other
important factors).
158. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 532 (citing cases).
159. The general requirements of rule 81(b)(2), commanding review of the entire appellate
record, notwithstanding the debate over the extent to which Rose itself limits the factors to be
considered in the review, allow, if not require, the appellate courts to consider any adverse
effects of prosecutorial argumentation, or even mentioning, of the parole laws. This may be
particularly important when such actions occur after the trial judge has given any curative
instruction to the jury. See Hupp v. State, 774 S.W.2d 56, 63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no
pet.) (en banc) (Rowe, J., dissenting).
160. See Johnson v. State, 774 S.W.2d 276,280 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, nopet.) (Burgess, J., dissenting) (prosecutor's argument significant factor in harm analysis; Woods v. State,
766 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no per) (prosecutor's argument, although other factors of Rose satisfied, enough to prevent finding of no harm beyond a
reasonable doubt); Allen v. State, 761 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, pet. ref'd) (implying prosecutor's argumentation a factor for consideration).
161. See Escobar v. State, 770 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no pet.) (prosecutor's argument in response to defense counsel's argument and thus proper, citing Albiar v.
State, 739 S.W.2d 360, 362 (rex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)); Harvey v. State, 762 S.W.2d
760, 762 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (prosecutors argument harmless
where pen-packets implied existence of parole and opposing counsel argued same matter).
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at the trial bench in order to preserve error for appellate review is unclear.1 62
The well established general rule provides that, even if the basis for objection
was clear, if the complainant failed to timely object, the complainant has
waived any error that may have resulted. 6 3 In Rose, however, the court
declared the unconstitutional statutory instruction void ab initio and, thus,
relieved the appellant of the necessity of objecting to preserve error.'"
Although the lower appellate courts have only infrequently discussed the
necessity of an objection to prosecutorial argument about parole laws, some
65
division among the courts still seems to exist.1

A particularly interesting issue that has not received enough attention
concerns the question of whether Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b)

allows a juror to testify on the issue of the effect that the instruction given in
article 37.07(4)(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has on the jury.
Rule 606(b) provides that a juror may not testify as to matters or statements
during deliberations nor as to matters influencing his/her mental process,
upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.166 The rule,
however, also provides that a juror may testify as to any matter relevant to

the validity of the verdict or indictment.' 67

The court's opinion in Rose considered rule 606(b) only so far as to state
that the rule prohibits jurors from testifying as to any matter or statement
during deliberation or to the effects of anything upon their mental
processes.168 Furthermore, on its own motion for rehearing, the opinion for
the Court remained completely silent on the issue. 169
162. Rose pointed out that discussion of the parole laws constitutes improper argumentation. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 532 (citing Heredia v. State, 528 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Tex. Crim. App.
1975)). Generally, courts limit prosecutorial argumentation to four areas: 1) summation of
the evidence, 2) reasonable deductions from the evidence, 3) answers to the argument of opposing counsel, and 4) pleas for law enforcement. Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973).
163. See Hernandez v. State, 774 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no pet.) (emphasizing need to object, disposing of argument as summation of law, and disregarding issue as
factor in harm analysis).
164. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 553. See Casares v. State, 768 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989) (en banc). But see Gilliam v. State, 766 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st
Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (noting in harm analysis that defense counsel made no objection to jury
charge).
165. Compare Rolling v. State, 768 S.W.2d 834, 839 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no pet)
(Kinkeade, J., dissenting) (failure to object to prosecutor's argument and to seek curative instruction precludes use of such argument as factor for consideration in harm analysis) with
Purcella v. State, 762 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.- App.-San Antonio 1988, no pet.) (unclear
whether defense is relieved of obligation to object to improper parole argumentation).
166. TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 606(b).
167. Id.
168. Rose, 752 S.W.2d 536.
169. Justice Teague, however, asserted that analysis of harm under rule 81(b)(2), in the
particular situation created by the unconstitutional instruction to the jury, could only be determined by a harmless error hearing at the trial court level where all the jurors would be required to testify. Id at 543 (Teague, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The second
half of rule 606(b), which provides that the juror may testify to any matter relevant to the
validity of the verdict or indictment, according to Justice Teague, clearly eliminates the first
half of the rule which generally proscribes juror testimony. Id. at 556 (Teague, J., concurring).
Thus, reasoned Justice Teague, juror testimony is not prohibited in the harm analysis under
rule 81(b)(2), particularly in light of the fact that the analysis concerns the imposition of pun-
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The appellate courts have given conflicting signals concerning the question of whether rule 606(b) would allow a juror to testify as to the effect of
the instruction mandated by article 37.07.170 The question is important because Rose declared that a rebuttable presumption arises that the jury followed the curative instruction given by the court to disregard parole in its
deliberations. Evidence to rebut this presumption may be difficult to find
and may only consist of juror testimony. 17 1 The only other evidence that
may be available to rebut the presumption is notes from the jury, and such
1 72
evidence, if it exists at all, will often be inconclusive.
In November of 1989 Texas voters passed by an overwhelming majority a
proposed constitutional amendment that grants the Texas Legislature the
authority to enact the mandatory parole law instruction found in article
37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 17 3 Earlier in 1989, the state
legislature enacted a bill that was virtually identical to the instruction declared unconstitutional in Rose to become effective upon adoption of the
1 74
constitutional amendment.
Prior to the adoption of the amendment, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held in a long line of cases that jury discussion of parole laws constituted juror misconduct. 175 This rule had as its constitutional basis the doctrine of separation of powers. 176 Parole laws were the sole province of the
executive branch and any discussion of parole laws by a jury in its deliberations was misconduct. Not all instances of such misconduct, however, constituted reversible error, and the courts developed numerous inconsistent
ishment, not the verdict on guilt or innocence. Id at 543-44 (Teague, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
170. Compare Buentello v. State, 770 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex. App.- Amarillo, 1989, pet.
granted) (606(b) allows juror to testify to determine misconduct based on discussion of parole)
with Leach v. State, 770 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989,pet refl'd) (606(b)
prohibits inquiry into jury foreman's conduct to show bias). See also Blackwel v. State, 768
S.W.2d 9, 11-12 n.l (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, nopet.) (unclear whether juror is permitted to testify as to consideration of parole under 606(b)).
171. See Blackwell, 768 S.W.2d at 11-12 n.1; Spelling v. State, 768 S.W.2d 949, 952 n.1
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no pet.).
172. See Spelling, 768 S.W.2d at 952 n.1 (jury note may be only routinely available evidence to rebut presumption); Martin v. State, 768 S.W.2d 12, 13 (rex. App.-Fort Worth
1989, no pet.) (jury note on parole clear indication of consideration of parole). But see Payne v.
State, 766 S.W.2d 585, 588 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989), rev'd sub nom., Arnold v. State, No.
TC-90-02-003 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 1990) (en bane) (jury note not indicative of considera.
tion where judge instructed jury to refer to charge that contained statutory curative.)
173. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (amended 1989). This amendment provides in relevant
part: "The Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws and laws that require or
permit courts to inform juries about the effect of good-conduct time and eligibility for parole or
mandatory supervision on the period of incarceration served by a defendant convicted of a
criminal offense." Id. § 1 1(a).
174. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1990). The language of
current article 37.07 is virtually identical to that in Rose, with two minor exceptions: replacement of the word "sentence" with the term "period of incarceration" and changes in the time
required for parole eligibility according to changes in the parole laws.
175. See Munroe v. State, 637 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc) (citing
cases).
176. Id, at 477 (citing Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (rex. Crim. App. 1978).
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standards to determine when reversal was required. 77 Sneed v. State,1 78
however, finally settled the issue by establishing a five-prong test to determine reversible error. The Sneed court stated that reversible error existed
when' there was: 1) a misstatement of the law, 2) asserted as a fact, 3) by one
professing to know the law, 4) which the other jurors relied upon, 5) who for
179
that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment.
The new constitutionally sanctioned parole law jury instruction statute,
like the nearly identical one declared unconstitutional in Rose, contains a
statutory curative instruction that instructs a jury that has just been informed about parole, not to consider parole in determining the punishment
in the defendant's case.180 Despite this ambivalent attitude about the proper
role of the subject of parole in the punishment deliberations of Texas juries,
Sneed, or any of the earlier parole discussion cases, most likely carry no
precedential force now that the constitutional amendment nullifies the separation of powers basis for these decisions. Furthermore, if Rose II is a guide,
the statutory curative instruction creates a presumption that the jury followed the instruction and parole was not considered. The presumption
seems meaningless, however, if the constitutional basis for the jury misconduct itself is absent.
If Sneed has any applicability, it will be in the situation where a jury's
discussion of parole contains inaccuracies,' 8 a scenario made less likely by
the fact that the jury takes into deliberation an accurate statement of the
parole law in the charge. Even if the defense shows a misstatement of the
parole law, the required showing of prejudice under Sneed would be necessary to rebut the presumption that the jury followed the instruction and was
not erroneously influenced. Furthermore, the admissibility of affidavits by
jurors establishing the fact of discussion and consideration of erroneous
statements about parole remains uncertain under Texas Rule of Evidence
606(b). Thus, Sneed appears to be of limited utility in evaluating the nearly
fossilized claim of jury misconduct based upon discussion of parole law.' 8 2
177. See Heredia v. State, 528 S.W.2d 847, 850-53 (rex. Crim. App. 1975).
178. 670 S.W.2d 262 Crex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
179. Id. at 266.
180. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
181. Sneed and its predecessors stated or assumed that any discussion of parole by the jury
was misconduct. Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 264-67. Sneed, on a separation of powers theory, required an inaccurate statement about parole in order for the error to require reversal. IdL at
266. Accuracy merely constituted one of the elements of Sneed's five-part test to determine if
the error was harmless. Id. A due process claim might exist, however, in that sentencing
decisions cannot be based upon inaccurate information. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736,
738-41 (1948).
182. As this article went to press, the court of criminal appeals consolidated several cases
raising the problem of the harmless error analysis of the parole law jury instruction. See Arnold v. State, No. TC-90-02-003 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 1990) (en banc).
The majority asserted that courts should base the harm analysis on the premise that a jury
that was given the unconstitutional instruction did consider parole in assessing punishment for
a particular defendant. Id. slip op. at 8-9. Addressing the factors found in Rose, the court held
that the additional curative instruction, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the jury
followed the instructions of the trial judge, must remain subordinate to the presumption of
harm created by Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. slip op. at 31.
The majority reasoned that a so called curative instruction was more fiction than fact, and,
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Videotape of Child Sexual Assault Victim

v. State 18 3

In Long
the court of criminal appeals addressed the constitutionality of article 38.071, section 2 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 18 4 which authorized the admission of a pretrial videotape of a child
sexual abuse victim without prior cross-examination by the defense.' 85 The
thus, courts should consider the additional curative instruction as only a factor in the overall
harm analysis. Id slip op. at 32. If a jury is shown to have considered parole and good-time,
the probative value of the curative instruction as a factor is completely lost because the instruction failed to accomplish its purpose. Id slip op. at 33. In addition, in a footnote, the court
rejected the analysis adopted by several courts that interpreted certain statutory provisions of
the parole instruction as having an independent curative affect. Id slip op. at 32 n.23 (citing
cases).
The court rejected those cases that asserted that the heinousness of the crime alone could
support a finding that the parole law instruction did not contribute to the punishment assessed.
Id at 33-35 (citing cases). The court described heinousness as "a slippery indicator for gauging how a jury evaluated conduct of appellant in assessing punishment." I4 slip op. at 34.
As for the third factor of significance in Rose, the defendant's criminal record, the court
clarified any misconceptions regarding the independent weight assigned to this factor. The
court stated that an extensive prior record alone did not establish the absence of harm beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. slip op. at 35. Thus, the court reduced the importance of the three
factors used in the harmless error analysis of Rose, and settled another major issue by holding
that these factors were by no means the only relevant issues for review under Rule 81(b)(2).
I slip op. at 9.
The majority opinion identified argument by counsel as significant to the overall process of
review. See id slip op. at 12-17. Although the court held that argumentation concerning
parole law was not error per se, it stated that:
[A]n argument .... made in terms tending to induce consideration of the eligibility formula and other teachings of a § 4 instruction compounds Rose error
and may influence the jury in its deliberations on punishment.
Id. slip op. at 13.
Another factor of particular importance to the harmless error analysis was the existence of a
note from the jury relating to parole. Id. slip op. at 17. The court held that such a note
"[p]atently .... reveals that jurors are then and there 'discussing' and 'considering' the subject." Id slip op. at 19.
The court took great issue with those cases in which courts had found harmless error based
upon the term of years finally assessed:
[l]t is not enough to say that a § 4 instruction made no contribution to punishment merely because the term assessed is "mid-range" relative to the potential
maximum. To the contrary, once a jury comes to understand that any term of
years beyond the formula number has no effect on eligibility for parole,... [it is]
willing to settle on a term higher than the minimum but within limits of the
formula .... Thus a verdict on punishment alone is not a gauge for harm;
rather, it serves somewhat as a barometric measure of other pressures we have
found are likely to influence the jury in assessing punishment.
Id slip op. at 21-22.

The court made no mention of the recently approved constitutional amendment authorizing

the legislature to reenact the parole and good-time instruction requirement. See supra notes

173-74 and accompanying text. Thus, courts will have to confront challenges to the now apparently constitutional instruction in future cases, including the basic question of whether any
discussion of parole by the jury remains per se jury misconduct.
183. 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
184. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38,071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
185. The statute did authorize the defendant to cross-examine the child-victim at trial, but
only if the defendant called the victim to the stand, a requirement that the Long court also
found objectionable. See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text. The videotape interview

of the child was admissible under § 2 of article 38.071 even though the defendant was not
allowed to be present when the recording was made. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.071, § 2 Vernon Supp. 1990).
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court held that section 2 of the statute violated an accused's right to face-toface confrontation and due process as guaranteed under both the Texas and
federal Constitutions.18 6 Although the court recognized that the prevention
of undue trauma to a child sexual abuse victim constituted a compelling
state interest, it found the statute unconstitutionally overbroad because the
statute assumed that confrontation in every case would produce unnecessary
trauma to a child.18 7 Long held that a compelling state interest could diminish a defendant's right to confrontation only when the prosecutor demonstrated the significance of the state interest based upon the particular facts of
each case. 18 Furthermore, even assuming that confrontation in every case
posed a sufficient threat to the child's welfare, thus rendering the child unavailable for live testimony at trial, the videotaped testimony lacked the requisite indicia of reliability because the statute did not afford the defendant an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the child. The court failed to allow
cross-examination at the time of the videotaping, and the defendant had no
right to be present.18 9 Although, the statute gave the defendant the right to
call and cross-examine the child at trial, the court held that fundamental
fairness prevented imposing upon the abused the Hobson's choice between
relinquishing his right to test the credibility of the victim on cross-examination and invoking that right but risking the wrath of the factflnder for having
to subject the child to the very trauma the statute was supposed to
alleviate. 190
The decision in Long left a number of issues unresolved, including the
constitutionality of other parts of the statute. Although presiding Judge McCormick dissented in Long, he wrote the opinion for a unanimous court of
criminal appeals in Powell v. State,191 which dealt with the constitutionality
of sections 4 and 5 of article 38.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 4 allows the trial court, on the motion of the defense or the
prosecution, to order that the testimony of a child sexual abuse victim be
taken outside of the courtroom and recorded for showing in the courtroom. 192 In addition, section 4 permits the defendant to observe and hear
the testimony of the child in person, but requires that the child be screened
so that he or she cannot hear or see the defendant.193 In Powell the State
186. Long, 742 S.W.2d at 309-10.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id at 316.
Id at 314.
Id at 304.
Id. at 320.
765 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
TEX. CODE CalM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
The section provides in part:
After an indictment has been returned or a complaint filed charging the de-

fendant with an offense to which this article applies, on its own motion or on the
motion of the attorney representing the state or the attorney representing the
defendant, the court may order that the testimony of the child be taken outside
the courtroom and be recorded for showing in the courtroom before the court
and the finder of fact... The court shall permit the defendant to observe and
hear the testimony of the child and to communicate contemporaneously with his
attorney during periods of recess or by audio contact but shall attempt to ensure
that the child cannot hear or see the defendant.
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requested that the child-victim's testimony be taken outside of court and
videotaped. The trial court overruled the defense's objections to these procedures, and a videotaped interview occurred that the court allowed the State
to admit at trial, over Powell's objection.1 94 At the conclusion of the
guilt/innocence stage of trial, Powell requested that the child-victim be
called to testify under cross-examination. Relying on section 6 of article
38.071, the trial court denied Powell's request. 9 5 Based upon the reasoning
of Long, the court of criminal appeals had little trouble in reaching the conclusion that, like section 2 of article 38.71, sections 4 and 5 constituted an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to confrontation under both the
state and federal Constitutions.1 9 6 Although the court allowed Powell's attorney to cross-examine the child during the videotaped interview, this
cross-examination did not satisfy the right to confrontation because it denied
Powell the right to face-to-face confrontation and the right to be present
during cross-examination, which includes the opportunity to communicate
with counsel during cross-examination.1 97 The United States Supreme
Court bolstered the court of criminal appeals' holding in a decision handed
down after Long, but before Powell. In Coy v. Iowa 198 the United States
Supreme Court held that a statute which allowed complaining witnesses to
testify in the defendant's presence but separated by a screen, violated the
right to confrontation.1 9 9
The holding that sections 4 and 5 of the statute are unconstitutional did
not, however; mean that the defendant was automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction for indecency with a child. Rather, the court of criminal appeals remanded the case to the court of appeals for a determination of
whether the erroneous admission of the videotape testimony constituted
harmless error.2 °° The decision to remand in Powell for a determination of
harmless error is consistent with the approach in Mallory v. State,20 ' which
held that Long was subject to a harmless error analysis. 202 Courts determine
the harmless error issue under the standard established by rule 81(b)(2). of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that a finding of
error requires reversal "unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the
Id
194. Powell, 765 S.W.2d at 436.
195. Section 6 of article 38.071 the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
If the court orders the testimony of a child to be taken under Section 3 or 4 of
this article or if the court finds the testimony of the child taken under Section 2
or 5 of this article is admissible into evidence, the child may not be required to
testify in court at the proceeding for which the testimony was taken, unless the
court finds there is good cause.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
196. Powell, 765 S.W.2d at 436-37.
197. Id at 436 n.1.

198. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
199. Id. at 1016.

200. Powell, 765 S.W.2d at 437.
201. 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
202. IAdat 569.
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punishment. ' 20 3 Generally, in cases where the State anticipated the possible
confrontation problems with the videotape statute and called the child to
testify at trial, courts hold the error harmless. 2°4 In contrast, where the
child-victim did not testify at trial, the appellate courts have been less likely
to find that the error made no contribution, beyond a reasonable doubt, to
20 5
the conviction.
Another important issue in the wake of Long deals with whether that decision should apply retroactively and, if so, to what extent. Ex parte
Hemby 20 6 appeared to give full retroactive effect to Long. Although the
Hemby court stated that it did not necessarily adopt the standard of Stovall
v. Denno20 7 in determining the retroactive effect of a new ruling, 208 the court
analyzed the problem using the three-prong test derived from that case.
Under the three-prong test, inquiry is made into "(a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 209 Hemby
held that the three prongs of the test do not carry equal weight, and that the
first prong, the purpose to be served, demands the most attention. 2 10 Particularly where the rule affects the truth-finding function of a trial, as is the
case with questions of confrontation and cross examination, full retroactive
application is appropriate. Holding that the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination have a direct bearing on the integrity of the fact-finding
process, the court of criminal appeals gave Hemby the benefit of the ruling in
Long, despite the afirmance of his conviction on appeal and the presentation
21 1
of his Long claim on collateral attack.
Later cases demonstrated that the retroactive application of Long would
be limited. Hemby had made an objection at trial on the basis of denial of
the right to confrontation and, thus, he had preserved error that could be
raised on state habeas corpus.
The habeas corpus applicant in Ex parte Crispen,212 however, failed to
make a contemporaneous objection at trial. The court held that the applicant was not entitled to consideration of his Long claim on the merits even
though the State tried the applicant prior to the decision in Long.21 3 The
failure to object to the showing of the videotaped interview of the complainant was not excused by the fact that Long had not yet been decided. The
203. TEx. R. APP. P. 81(b)(2).
204. See Severn v. State, 767 S.W.2d 914, 914-15 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no pet.);

Whittemore v. State, 766 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, pet. ref'd). But see
Lowrey, 764 S.W.2d 4 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no pet.).
205. See Lawson v. State, 757 S.W.2d 122, 123-24 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,
no pet.).
206. 765 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
207. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
208. Hemby, 765 S.W.2d at 794.
209. 388 U.S. at 297.
210. 765 S.W.2d at 792 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969)).
211. 765 S.W.2d at 793-94.
212. 777 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
213. Id at 105.
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court noted that the rights to confrontation and due process upon which

Long was based were well-established doctrines at the time of trial.214
Not only is Long available retroactively only to those who had the foresight to object at trial, but the state constitutional aspects of Long cannot be
collaterally attacked notwithstanding the language about full retroactivity in
Hemby' In an analysis concerning the scope of state habeas corpus, the
court in Ex parte Dutchover2t 5 held that because Mallory v. State216 had
held that Long was subject to harmless error analysis, the court could not
consider the issue on collateral attack even if the defense made a contemporaneous objection at trial.217 As the Dutchover opinion candidly admitted,
under Long, the retroactivity of state constitutional claims has become a
moot issue.2 18

III. STATE HABEAS CORPUS
One of the most important developments in the criminal law field in the
cases decided during the survey period concerned the trend to limit the
availability of state habeas corpus to collaterally attack criminal convictions.
Courts erected procedural barriers to collateral attack under article 11.07 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure02 1 9 and restricted the scope of the
substantive issues that defendants can raise in a state habeas corpus petition.
These barriers and restrictions appeared in holdings that seem to have been
influenced by several United States Supreme Court decisions that have cur22 0
tailed the availability of federal habeas corpus.
In Ex parte Banks22 1 the court of criminal appeals evinced a stricter view
of the procedural requirements necessary for considering the merits of
claims brought under article 11.07.222 Although defense counsel for Banks
raised an objection at trial to the granting of the State's challenges for cause
because of bias under article 35.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
the defense failed to present this claim on direct appeal.2 23 Citing the often
repeated language that "the Great Writ should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on appeal," the Banks court held that the
214. Id.
215. 779 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
216. 752 S.W.2d 566 (rex. Crim. App. 1988).
217. Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d at 77.
218. It
219. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977 and Supp. 1990).
220. The term federal habeas corpus denotes collateral attacks by state inmates on the
validity of a state court conviction in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). The first
indication of the reduced availability of state habeas corpus and the adoption of an approach
consistent with a more restrictive federal view of collateral attack came in Exparte Reneir, 734
S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), which abandoned the formally broad Texas view of the
requirement that an inmate be in custody before being able to have a habeas corpus petition
considered.
221. 769 S.W.2d 539 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
222. Id at 540-41. The court of criminal appeals denied, without written opinion, all the
grounds that Banks raised in his application for writ of habeas corpus except those concerning
the alleged improper excusal of three prospective jurors.
223. Id at 540.
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improper exclusion of a prospective juror on statutory grounds could not 224
be
considered for the first time in an application for writ of habeas corpus.
The court's holding represents a subtle but important change in the law. As
Judge Clinton pointed out in his dissenting opinion, past cases that had referred to the language about the unavailability of the writ of habeas corpus
to litigate matters that should have been raised on direct appeal meant that
the scope of collateral attack is narrower than direct appeal. 225 Many
claims, such as insufficient evidence, which can be raised on direct appeal
cannot be raised on collateral attack because the issue does not involve a
claimed deprivation of a fundamental or constitutional right. Ex parte
Banks, however, cited this language in creating a new procedural requirement. Even if the court considers the state law claim fundamental, the fail-6
22
ure to present the claim on direct appeal results in a procedural default.
If the defense omits the state law claim on direct appeal, the court will not
consider the question of whether the claim is sufficiently fundamental or of
constitutional dimension to justify habeas corpus relief.227 Ex parte Banks
carefully distinguished the holding in Ex parte Bravo,22 8 in which the court
considered a claim on the merits that the defense had not raised on direct
appeal, because the claim of the improper exclusion of a prospective juror in
that case was based upon the federal constitution and not on state statutory
grounds. 229 Courts echoed this preference for federal constitutional claims
over state constitutional claims in other collateral attack cases decided during the survey period.

Although Ex parte Banks concerned only a state statutory claim, the
habeas corpus applicant in Ex parte Crispen230 raised state and federal constitutional issues. Nonetheless, the court of criminal appeals refused to consider the merits of the claim because of another type of procedural default:
the failure of the defendant to object at trial.23 1 Although the court of criminal appeals has long required a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve error for review both on direct appeal and collateral attack, the
importance of Ex parte Crispen was the court's refusal to excuse the procedural default despite the fact that the applicant's trial preceded the case
upon which he based his claim. A pretrial videotaped interview, made in
accordance with article 38.07(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
of the child-sexual abuse complainant by a social worker, was introduced at
Crispen's trial.232 Even though the court of criminal appeals decided Long
v. State, 233 which declared the child videotape statute unconstitutional, after
the defendant's trial, and the only court of appeals to address the issue prior
224. Id.
225. Ia at 547 (Clinton J.,
dissenting).
226. Ia at 540-41.
227. Id.
228. 702 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
229. Banks, 769 S.W.2d at 540-41.
230. 777 S.W.2d 103 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
231. Id. at 105.
232. Id at 104.
233. 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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to applicant's trial had upheld the statute,2 34 the court of criminal appeals
refused to excuse the defendant's failure to raise an objection. 2 35 The Cris_pen court stated that the Long decision was based on well-recognized principles of due process and the right of confrontation. Thus, although the court
had not yet declared the specific statute at issue unconstitutional, the court
believed that the claimed defect was not so novel as to excuse the failure to
object.

23 6

Crispen'sstringent view of procedural default coincides with recent federal
case law with respect to the impact of a failure to make a contemporaneous
objection on collateral review. Since the landmark decision in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 23 7 if a federal habeas corpus applicant fails to object at trial, the court
may not consider the claim on collateral attack unless the defendant shows
cause for failing to object and prejudice from having failed to do so.238 One

of the few ways available for the defendant to show cause is by establishing
that the claim raised was too novel to require an objection.239 Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, however, have only grudgingly
conceded this narrow exception and have required a contemporaneous objection for constitutional claims that were embryonic in their develop234. See Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Crim. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984),
rev'd, 739 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
235. Ex parte Crispen, 777 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. Crin. App. 1987).
236. I at 105-06. In a concurring opinion in Crispen, Judge Clinton agreed with the
majority, but also raised the question of the proper scope of collateral attack as another reason
to deny the applicant habeas corpus relief. IAL at 106-10 (Clinton, J., concurring). Judge Clinton referred to his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Banks, in which he reviewed the history of
the development of state habeas corpus, emphasizing that it was originally available only to
attack jurisdictional defects. Through legislative enactment of article 11.07 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure and the court of criminal appeals' interpretation of it in Ex parte
Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967), the writ was expanded to provide an avenue
of relief for fundamental error and state and federal constitutional claims. In his Crispen concurrence, judge Clinton pointed out, however, that "states are not compelled by any provision
of the federal constitution to provide post-conviction collateral avenues for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Crispen, 777 S.W.2d at 107 (Clinton, J., concurring). Judge Clinton reasoned that if the states are free to dispense with collateral attack altogether, they are
free to establish what issues will be recognized on collateral attack. In an opinion that will
result in a major reduction of the availability of state habeas corpus if adopted by a majority of
the court of criminal appeals, Judge Clinton proposed that the judiciary should only recognize
federal constitutional claims that are exceptional or fundamental. Id. at 107-8. Preferring to
confine the scope of habeas corpus through limitation of'subject matter, rather than by the
creation of procedural obstacles, Judge Clinton would recognize such exceptional claims even
if they were not properly preserved by objection at trial. Id. at 108-9. If courts fail to adopt,
this approach Judge Clinton suggested in a footnote that courts should at least require the
defendant to show in a habeas corpus petition that the alleged constitutional error "in fact
more likely than not contributed to his conviction." Id. at 109 n.6. In fact, Judge Clinton's
views proved influential. Two important decisions narrowing the scope of state habeas review
have the clear imprint of the language and reasoning of Judge Clinton's dissent in Banks and
his concurrence in Crispen. See Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989);
Exparte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). See infra notes 244, 252,
and 256.
237. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
238. IId at 77-91.
239. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12-20 (1984).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

ment. 24° As a result of cases like Crispen and Wainwright and their progeny,
criminal defense attorneys must now object at trial in order to insure that
they have preserved potential error for claims that are contrary to current
law, but which courts may recognize in the future.
In addition to limiting the availability of habeas corpus through restrictive
procedural requirements, two important decisions of the court of criminal
appeals narrowed the scope of the issues that are cognizable on state habeas
corpus. In Ex parte Tuan Van Truong24 1 the state habeas corpus applicant
claimed that the parole law jury charge mandated by article 37.07(4) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which Rose v. State242 declared unconstitutional, tainted his punishment. The court of criminal appeals failed to
reach the merits of the claim, asserting that the error did not constitute such
24 3
a fatal error as to render the sentence invalid and the judgment void.
Thus, even if the defense satisfied the procedural requirements and the applicant was in custody and had preserved error by objecting at trial and raising
the claim on appeal, the court will not consider such a claim in a habeas
corpus proceeding because the error was not serious enough to render the
2
judgment void. "
Judge Teague's dissent clarified the actual holding of the majority opinion.
Judge Teague stated:
[W]hat the majority opinion in this case teaches is that voidness and
harmlessness are mutually exclusive concepts.... Here, applicant is
denied relief because his claim is not cognizable in habeas corpus. It
isn't cognizable because, even if his contentions are true, the judgment
he attacks is not void. The judgment cannot be void because void judgments aren't subject to a harm analysis. Consequently, any defect 24
subject to the harmless error rule is not cognizable in habeas corpus.
The court made explicit Judge Teague's interpretation of Tuan Van
246
Truong later in the term in the per curiam opinion in Ex parte Dutchover,
in which Teague alone dissented. Like the applicant in Ex parte Crispen,
Dutchover attacked the validity of his conviction of indecency with a child
on the ground that the court admitted into evidence a videotape of the complainant under the authority of article 38.071(2) of the code of criminal procedure, which the court declared unconstitutional in Long v. State.247 Long
240. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-95 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 12435 (1984).
241. 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
242. 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
243. Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at 813.
244. Although the opinion was issued as a per curiam opinion, most of the opinion was
taken verbatim from the dissenting opinion of Judge Clinton in Ex parte Banks. Compare
Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at 811-13 with Exparte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, 543-47 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989). Judge Clinton advocates limiting habeas corpus relief to only those claims
that go to the most fundamental nature of the fairness of a trial. Banks, 769 S.W.2d at 541-48.
Significantly, only Judge Teague dissented to the per curiam decision in Tuan Van Truong, a
dissent apparently influenced by Judge Clinton's analysis. Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at
813.
245. Id at 814-15.
246. 779 S.W.2d 76 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
247. Id. at 77.
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held that the statute violated both the right to due process and the right2 to
48
confrontation, which both the Texas and federal Constitutions recognize.
As to the claim under the state constitution, the court of criminal appeals,
citing Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, held that because the Long right was
subject to a harm analysis, it is "at best voidable, and as such is not subject
to a collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus." 249 Thus, after Dutchover,
applicants cannot raise state statutory and constitutional claims in a state
petition for habeas corpus unless the claim is one of the few that would not
be susceptible to a harm analysis. Traditionally, a state habeas applicant has
had the burden of establishing that a claimed error was prejudicial, but
Dutchover goes much further; an applicant will not receive review on the
merits of a state statutory or constitutional claim, even if he could show
harm, if the type of claim raised is one that could constitute harmless error.
Only a few such claims exist, and a defendant could probably plead those in
federal constitutional terms.250 Thus, the court has virtually eliminated
state constitutional and statutory claims from collateral attack in the state of
Texas.
Because Long created error under both the state and federal constitution,
the court went on to consider the defendant's federal constitutional claims.
Finding that the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection at
trial in Long and that the holding in Ex parte Crispen did not excuse the
failure, the court indicated that the defendant was not entitled to state collateral relief for the federal component of his Long claim. 2 51 Although the
court could have ended the opinion at this point with a citation to Ex parte
2 52
Crispen, the per curiam opinion continued.
In a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, any error mandates reversal
unless the court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error made
no contribution to the conviction or punishment. In a collateral attack,
however, the courts place the burden upon the applicant to establish the
illegality of his restraint. 253 As a result, Dutchover held that courts ought to
require an applicant to plead and prove facts showing that the error actually
contributed to his conviction or sentence. 25 4 After having adopted the
equivalent of the federal habeas corpus requirement of showing "cause" for
failure to object in Crispen, the court in Dutchover apparently adopted the
248. Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 318-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
933 (1988); see supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.

249. Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d at 77.
250. In addition to claims of lack of jurisdiction and double jeopardy, which relate to the
court's power to try the defendant at all, only a few other claims apparently are immune from
a harmless error analysis. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding total deprivation of counsel to an indigent immune); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding a
coerced confession immune); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (holding a mob-dominated trial immune).
251. Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d at 77-78.
252. The balance of the Dutchover opinion is a virtual verbatim adoption of footnote six of
Judge Clinton's concurring opinion in Crispen, 777 S.W.2d 103, 109 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989).
253. Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d at 77-78.
254. Id at 78.
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equivalent of the federally required showing of "prejudice." The court of
criminal appeals, therefore, appears to have adopted the "cause and prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 255 which the United States Supreme
Court developed for determining the effect of procedural default for federal
habeas corpus review.
Dutchover makes it clear that the scope of habeas corpus review will be
more restricted in the future, but it is unclear how wide the door has been
left open to collateral attack in state court and what exact procedural burdens courts will impose on defendants.2 56 Particularly since most inmates
file state habeas corpus petitions pro se, the court of criminal appeals should
articulate clear procedural requirements and general principles for determining those claims that are of sufficient magnitude to justify collateral relief.

255. 443 U.S. 72 (1977).
256. For example, in one part of the Dutchover opinion the court speaks in terms of the
requirement that the applicant show that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d at 77. In another part, however, the court stated that the
applicant must demonstrate that "the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the
punishment," Id. at 78. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court stated that the defendant must
show that the error did in fact contribute to his conviction or punishment. Id at 77-78. The
court adopted the entire analysis from footnote six of the concurring opinion of Judge Clinton
in Crispen, which stated that the error "in fact more likely than not contributed to his conviction." Crispen, 777 S.W.2d at 109 n.6. Thus, the exact burden placed on the defendant in a
habeas corpus petition raising federal constitutional claims is anything but clear. Similarly,
while state statutory and constitutional grounds appear to have been eliminated, uncertainty
also exists as to which types of federal constitutional claims are sufficiently fundamental so as
to call into question the validity of a conviction attacked collaterally.

